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ABSTRACT 
Corruption in all ramifications has continued to jeopardize the efforts of 
governments in forging national unity, infrastructural development and 
in most cases, leaving the majority of a nation’s citizens to live in 
absolute poverty. The phenomenon has persisted in many countries 
mostly due to weak political will or the lack of it necessary to curb the 
menace. In its simplest form corruption reflects the use of public office 
for private gain. As a remedy to this there should be a demonstration of 
credible intent by political leaders, stakeholders groups to attack 
perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level. This 
demonstration of credible capacity reflects political will. The political will 
to curb corruption is also the political will to pursue other goals like 
good governance and national unity. Political will is not equivalent to 
political manifesto rhetoric or pressure group statements. Rather, it is 
the manifestation of a robust system of checks and balances and 
strong political institutions for combating corruption and promoting good 
governance as well as restoring trust and confidence in democratic 
politics. Gowon’s  proposal reflects strong political will for good 
governance, because, if political will is to be more than just a slogan, it 
must be understood in a broad context. This reinforces the believe that 
if there is an absence of political will at the top, there will be a general 
lack of commitment to combat corruption, and pursue other important 
national goals as political development and poverty reduction. The 
exploratory research design was adopted for the study. 
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Secondary data were generated through a format designed by the investigator for the 
purpose of the study. Because of the sensitive nature of the study primary data were 
also generate through a Liker-type questionnaire to supplement the secondary data. 
Data generated were analyzed through descriptive and X2 statistics and presented in 
tables with absolute figures capable of easy understanding and further analysis. It 
was found that political will is essential in anticorruption crusade management in 
Nigeria, and has the reciprocal dimension of providing the incentives for good 
governance of any nation. 
Keywords: Reciprocal dimension; A robust system of checks and balances; 
promoting good governance; Restoring trust and confidence; Democratic politics; 
Rule out disintegration, Wahala. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Political will involves the demonstration of genuine aspiration of political 
leaders and significant stakeholders to check perceived causes or effects of 
corruption at a systemic level in society. Kpundeh (1999) posits that political will is a 
critical starting point for sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and 
programmes.  
 According to him, the lack of political will to systematically fight corruption 
allowed abusive practices to continue and eventually became a way of life for Sierra 
Leoneans under former Presidents Stevens, Momoh, and Strasser. He states that 
commissions of inquiry in that country showed that corrupt practices led to the 
ravaging of the treasury and contributed to the economic despondency of the 
country.  
 Corruption in its simplest terms is the abuse of power, most often for personal 
gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance (STAPENHURST; 
SEDIGH, 1999). Corruption is a destroyer; it corrodes the democratic ethos, spreads 
its filth and eventually imperils democracy.  
 If left alone, corruption will spread, multiply, intensify, systemize and eventually 
institutionalize itself, thereby becoming the norm and no longer the exception 
(UNIAMIKOGBO, 2007). Therefore, political will is seen as the manifestation of a 
robust system of checks and balances and strong political institutions for combating 
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corruption and promoting good governance as well as restoring trust and confidence 
in democratic politics.  
 According to Hopkinson and Pelizzo (2006), to curb corruption effectively, the 
commitment of government and parliament is above all required. If there is an 
absence of political will at the top, there will be a general lack of commitment to 
enforce laws and punish the corrupt. Almost all national anti-corruption agencies 
point to political will as the main precondition for their effective operation. For 
effective anti-corruption crusade, there must be political will at the highest level, 
because malpractice at any level will undermine trust in the political system as a 
whole.  
 Marshall (2006) posits that leadership is necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for controlling corruption, if for no other reason than that tackling corruption 
can unleash opposition to reform. Therefore, Kpundeh and Dininio (2006) believe 
that political will, as it applies to anti-corruption crusade is most effective when it is 
institutionalized and not dependent on the personality and intentions of a particular 
individual.  
 Accordingly, reformers can promote institutionalization of political will by 
establishing and equipping political institutions with adequate autonomy, authority, 
resources, and qualified manpower. Such institutionalization grows and develops a 
forum of mutually reinforcing accountability and transparency. The political will to 
reduce corruption has much in common with the political will to pursue any other 
goal, such as infrastructure development and poverty reduction.  
 Political will must be given space to grow from within a political system and 
eventually becomes an integral part of political, social and economic processes. 
Without the institutionalization of political will, wedging any war against corruption will 
be an exercise in futility. For example, despite the anticorruption rhetorics in Nigeria 
since the military regime, and up to the present democratic experiment, and the 
passage into law of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act during the 
first tenure of Obasanjo’s Presidency, the wahala of massive corruption still persists 
in Nigeria.  
 Probably because of the lack of political will to check corruption in Nigeria, 
Presidents, Governors, legislators, including local government Chairmen and 
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councilors, automatically become billionaires once in office and even after leaving 
political office. The same applies to ministers, commissioners and sundry 
government officials. This happens at the detriment of infrastructural development, 
unemployment and absolute poverty. It is estimated that over 70 percent of Nigerians 
live below the poverty level (UGOANI, 2015).  
 In all efforts to combat corruption, the commitment of elected representatives 
and other public officials is pivotal. According to Staphenhurst and Sedigh (1999) if 
those who govern a society lack the political will to refrain from corruption and 
institute change, real reform is difficult to undertake and virtually impossible to 
sustain.  
 In addition, pressure for reform that stems from the lower ranks of the 
bureaucracy can be frustrated by the absence of political will or interest among 
higher level public servants and political office holders. Political will is critical to fight 
corruption in Nigeria because the trickle down development strategies is insufficient.  
 Fighting corruption, human capital development, through informal and formal 
employment generation and rapid advances in public services must remain a key 
plank of development strategies (MANUEL, 2003). Corruption may be defined as the 
use of public office for private gain. It can take on a multitude of faces; its scale can 
be grand or petty.  
 Corruption may be classified into three broad types: state capture which is 
often equated with grand corruption or political corruption, patronage and nepotism, 
and administrative corruption. While these forms of corruption overlap significantly, 
they are not equivalent. Patronage is politically motivated, and administrative 
corruption can involve huge sums like commissions from huge rigged contracts.  
 Grand corruption refers to corruption that involves extraordinary large side 
payments; political corruption refers to favours exchanged for support, financial or 
otherwise, to buttress or sustain the political power of individuals or groups, such as 
illegal campaign contributions. Kleptocracy and cronyism are other forms of political 
corruption.  
 In these cases, political leaders use the organ of the state to enrich 
themselves, children, family members, friends and associates through legal and 
illegal means. (CAMPOS; BHARGERG, 2007). It is curious that despite acceptance 
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by governments like in Nigeria and other late developing democracies that corruption 
exists and is serious, there is always a general lack of political will to implement 
recommendations and the necessary legislation to combat corruption (EMMANUEL; 
OMOMIA, 2012; HOPKINSON; PELIZZO, 2006) Marshall (2006) insists that 
corruption is a clear threat to development, democracy, and international security.  
 It distorts economic and social development and subverts political decision-
making, stunting growth and creating political instability. Corruption is closely linked 
to failing public institutions and failed public policies, undermining the legitimacy of 
governments at all levels. It drains national finances, acting as a major disincentive to 
securing foreign investment, as well as destroying the work ethic of the citizens.  
 Corruption can have a profoundly negative impact on patriotism and 
commitment to the national goals and ideals, and it also deepens poverty. These 
factors combine to show that combating corruption is an issue for both national 
regional and global authorities. The monumental corruption in Nigeria today attracts 
global attention, to the extent that the G.7 leaders of the world believe that the 
Nigerian economy is mismanaged (TAIWO-OBALONYE, 2015).  
 Straw (2014) posits that there must be transparency in governance at all levels 
in order to effectively tackle the menace of corruption in Nigeria. A former British 
Foreign Secretary, he also suggests that there must be incorruptible judiciary to give 
appropriate penalties against corrupt officials to ensure that the war against 
corruption in Nigeria succeeds – (OMOTOSO, 2013; OMOTOSO, 2011; 
OGUNWALE, 2012; EMMANUEL, 2014; OBIJIOFOR, 2013; ALLI, 2012). Corruption 
disrupts governance, reduces the provisions of services by the government and its 
institutions (UGURU; IBEOGU, 2014). 
1.1 Statement of the problem 
 There is significant empirical evidence that corruption exists in Nigeria, but 
there is no evidence that there is the political will to check it. The wahala of serious 
allegations of massive corruption in government and the oil and gas industry is 
monumental.  
 Corruption appears to be flowing unquenchably like the River Niger in the oil 
and gas industry from where the nation derives over 90 percent of its revenue. Also 
people in government become billionaires overnight in a country with over 8000 
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abandoned projects that would require over N5trn to complete in over 30 years, 
where major public enterprises are given away on political patronage without proper 
valuation, and where the majority of the citizens live in absolute poverty.  
 A country where 50 percent of the federating states despite heavy borrowings 
cannot pay workers salaries, but where the ex-presidents, ex-governors, ex-this and 
ex-that live like emperors, must be a thoroughly corrupt country. A country with 
leaders who parade shining certificates but without moral capacity and political will to 
deal with corruption and promote good governance. (OMOTOSO, 2013; 
EMMANUEL, 2014; GABRIEL, 2015; JEYIFO, 2013; OJO, 2015; OLABIYI, 2015; 
AMODU, 2015; DAILY SUN NEWS, 2015; UGWUANYI, 2011; DAKA, 2012; 
ORINTUNSIN, 2014).  
 Without the benefit of accurate statistics , it is evident that from organized 
media reports there could be thousands of pending corruption allegations of which 
the political leaders lack the political will to prosecute to conclusion. Prominent 
among them includes the ground breaking mega oil subsidy scam involving about 
$2.58trn.  
 Government remains helpless in this case that has helped in securing a 
permanent seat for Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. 
Corruption cases such as loading cash in private jets across the world, mutilated 
local currency theft, tax evasion by oil and gas companies, multiple cases of 
unremitted billions of dollars to the federation account, steeling of pension cash, 
giving and receiving bribes, wasteful budgeting, remain among the many corrupt 
practices in Nigeria. Nothing more is required more than political will on the part of 
political leaders to push the frontiers of corruption backwards. (ABUBEKAR; 
MUSARI, 2015; TAIWO-OBALONYE, 2015; MERNYI, 2015A; TSA, 2015; MERNYI, 
2015B; OJIABOR, 2012; NWOSU, 2013; ALLI, 2013; ISA, 2014; ERIYE, 2012; ISA, 
2014B; NZESH, 2014; ONANUGA, 2012; ALLI, 2012B; OLUWASEGUN; ANOFI, 
2013; MALOGO, 2013)   
1.2 Objective of the study 
 The study was designed to explore the relevance of political will in 
anticorruption crusade management in Nigeria. 
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1.3 Significance of the study 
 The study will enable students of public policy and others, researchers, and 
the general public have insights about the relationship between political will and 
anticorruption crusade management. 
1.4 Delimitation of the study  
 The study was delimited to Abia State, South-East Nigeria. Abia State is one 
of the 36 States in Nigeria and it was assumed that the views of the people in Abia 
State will represent the views of the people in Nigeria. 
1.5 Limitations of the study 
 The study was constrained by lack of statistics on corruption cases and 
current literature in the area of study. However, these important limitations did not 
impair the academic focus of the study. 
1.6 Hypotheses 
 To achieve the objective of the study, the following hypotheses were posed, 
and test at 0.05 level of significance: 
Ho:  There is no relationship between political will and anticorruption crusade 
management 
Hi:  There is a relationship between political will and anticorruption crusade 
management.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Before the present administration, preceding administrations in Nigeria had 
successively instituted legal instruments, measures and policies designed to combat 
corruption in the country. According to Uniamikogbo (2007) these remedial measures 
did not achieve the desired results to prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt 
practices.  
 The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 was the first to be 
passed into law by the Obasanjo Presidency, while the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) were inaugurated on the 
29th of September 2000. There is also, the Economic and Financial Crimes 
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Commission (EFCC) charged with the responsibility for the enforcement of all 
economic and financial crimes, laws, among other things.  
 Despite the anxiety of government over corruption expressed through these 
reform programmes political will is on a long holiday, and corruption continues to 
flourish like the morning rose. As it grows, it manifests in many ways, like 
infrastructural decay, poverty, etc. 
2.1. Corruption and Infrastructural decay  
 The idea of dispensing with public enterprises was partly due to corruption and 
inefficiency that led to dwindling resources. For example, the reform in the 
telecommunications sector was motivated by the inability of government to continue 
to fund public enterprises being mismanaged and to reduce corruption.  
 Public sector giants like the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was 
riddled with corruption and inefficiency that led to its dismemberment along 
geopolitical zones for more reasons of political patronage and expediency. According 
to Uniamikogbo (2007) in 1999, the Federal Government owned a total of 590 Public 
Enterprises (PEs) worth about US$100bn as at 1996.  
 As a result of unproductive investments in and the inefficiency of these 
enterprises in terms of the quality of services rendered, privatization was introduced 
as a practical solution. However, as a result of lack of political will, the exercise is 
today accused of lack of transparency, and has not yielded any meaningful results in 
terms of employment generation and poverty reduction among the citizens.  
 The abandonment of over 8000 projects that require over N5trn to complete 
and without any body accountable for such corruption practices is a display of lack of 
political will on the part of government to combat corruption. (ORINTUNSIN, 2014; 
OMOTOSO, 2011; OGUNWALE, 2012; EMMANUEL, 2014; ALLI, 2012; MALOGO, 
2012).  
 At present, the Federal Government fears that the privalitzation of NITEL and 
MTEL was transparent. The rate of infrastructural decay in Nigeria is alarming. 
According to Nwachi (2013) a document prepared by a group of research experts, 
commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Finance listed 30 most corrupt institutions in 
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Nigeria with the police and the defunct Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) 
as the most corrupt.  
 The document which was made available to Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC) ranked the ministries and parastatals according to their levels of 
involvement in various corrupt practices in the past. The first and second most 
corrupt agencies in Nigeria have been and still remain the police and defunct PHCN, 
respectively.  
 While the third, fourth, fifth and sixth most corrupt institutions of government 
are the political parties, the executive arm of federal, state and local governments, 
members of the national and state assemblies and the court. Others are the 
Customs, Federal Road Safety Commission, (FRSC) offices of the accountant – 
general at both federal and state levels and water boards.  
 According to the report, no public service sector is rated, as somewhat or very 
honest by up to 50 percent. For the ICPC, it was a pointer in the direction to look for 
corrupt public officials in fulfillment of its mandate but nothing was actually done. 
Grand corruption cases like the SAGEM, SA. ID Scandal involving about US$241m 
and the Halliburton scandal involving about US$182m are yet to be disposed off.  
 This is perhaps due to impunity. Corrupt politicians disobey court orders as a 
means of staying in office. For example, when a federal high court in Abuja ordered 
on 2 December 2010, the immediate reinstatements of six suspended members of 
the House of Representative others served notice of appeal. Bankole did not want 
the suspended members to return even though the Abuja court had ruled that the 
continued suspension of the members was a form of “tyranny of the majority”.  
 The parliament is critical for effective anticorruption crusade management. If 
political will is to be more than just a slogan, it must be understood in a broad 
context. Particularly where democratic politics is in place or emerging in sustainable 
ways, political will requires leaders willing to attack corruption and support agencies 
ready to back them up, reward success, and exact political price for failure or deceit 
(OBIJIOFOR, 2011; NWACHI, 2013; EFULU, 2015; OBINNA, 2015; OMOMBI, 2015; 
TAIWO-OHANONYE, 2015; UKEH, 2015).  
 Corruption in the power sector is yet to be quantified in terms of Naira and 
Dollar. Despite billions of dollars pumped into the sector in the last sixteen years, 
  
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/] 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License 
 81 
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P) 
http://www.ijmp.jor.br            v. 7, n. 1, January - March 2016 
ISSN: 2236-269X 
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v7i1.382 
Nigerians are yet to record any meaningful improvement in power supply. The senate 
has now decided to investigate the matter. According to Anuforo (2015) shortly after 
the exit of President Obansanjo, there were outcries that the Power Sector should be 
investigated to uncover how over US$12bn reportedly spent to upgrade power 
infrastructure was simply stolen and pocketed by the politicians manning the power 
ministry.  
 
2.2.  Corruption and Poverty. 
 The concept of poverty refers to a situation in which an 
individual/community/country lacks the capacity to independently secure a decent 
standard of living or decent quality of life. Specifically, at the individual level poverty 
is reflected by deprivation and lack of access to basic necessities of life such as 
adequate food, decent clothing, suitable business, safe drinking water, good 
education, good medical care, and gainful employment, inability to fulfill social and 
cultural obligations that are important (OBASI, 2001).  
 Although poverty is a world wide phenomenon, but the prevalence of the 
disease is compounded in Nigeria due to corruption. The question of poverty is no 
longer negotiable in Nigeria of today where 18 out of 36 state governments owe the 
workers huge salary arrears of up to 3-6 months. Some of the governors of the 
defaulting states are standing trial on charges of corruption.  
 Some of them even won fresh elections. There is no political will on the part of 
government to avoid corruption providing incentives for the actions and inactions of 
corrupt leaders to deepen poverty through non payment of workers salaries, among 
others. Economists suggest that the wage system is a fine way of income 
distribution, it therefore follows that when a huge part of the population in a country 
does not have regular or steady source of income, it will result to coefficient 
inequality between the rich and the poor. Corruption can destroy the work ethics of 
citizens and above all, it deepens poverty (GABRIEL, 2015; MARSHALL, 2006). 
 Political will is necessary to good governance architecture that connects broad 
concerns about how economic, social, and political institutions are organized with the 
specific intention of taking specific steps to reducing corruption and poverty in 
society. 
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2.3.  Lessons from other Countries 
 According to Hopkinson and Pelizzo (2006) corruption will always exist, 
because it cannot be eliminated totally, but can be curbed or controlled. They insist 
that corruption is regarded as the most significant political challenge in most Central 
and East European countries. They opine that although corruption is universal, states 
in transition, where democracy and a market economy have only recently been 
established, are particularly afflicted.  
 According to Kpundeh (1999) corruption became a way of life in Sierra Leone 
during the presidency of Stevens, Momoh and Strasser, not because of lack of 
anxiety, but due largely to lack of political will by government to check corruption. 
During the period unscrupulous civil servants, policians, and business people sought 
to raise their standards of living through bribery, which in some cases became more 
accurately described as extortion.  
 A lack of political will resulted in the absence of adequate sanctions or the 
failure to enforce them. People had to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of 
following the rules and decide how they are best served. Thus, if the benefits 
outweigh the costs, more people than not chose wrongdoing as a customary way of 
supplementing their income. In this way, corruption was institutionalized in Sierra 
Leone. Corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that 
affects all societies, and economies, making international cooperation to prevent and 
control it essential (WILLIAMS, 2006).  
 Kaufmann (1997) points to the case of Kenya, where prevalent corruption and 
its negative macroeconomic consequences compelled the International Monetary 
Fund to suspend its lending in 1997. In the same year, on the heels of mounting 
pressure from civil society and the international community the president of Kenya 
issued pronouncements against corruption. As a follow-up to the president’s remarks, 
the office of the Attorney General released the following statements.  
 The Government has this morning formed an anticorruption squad to look into 
the conduct of the anticorruption commission, which has been overseeing the 
anticorruption taskforce, which was earlier set up to investigate the affairs of a 
government adhoc committee appointed earlier this year to look into the issue of 
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high-level corruption among corrupt Government Officers. Kaufmann (1997) posits 
that this type of example may be an extreme case of how not to address the problem 
of corruption. Unfortunately many similar statements had been reported in countries 
in Asia, Latin America and the former Soviet Union.  
 It is almost usual for corrupt politicians to engage in rhetoric about eliminating 
corruption and the pressure from the donor community. Nevertheless, statements like 
the one from Kenya represent weak political will, because it never showed exactly 
the direction of government. In response to pressures for political will, uncommitted 
political leaders often show weak political will, which is another constraint to weeding 
out corruption.  
 Such anticorruption rhetoric as a result of weak political will has been a routine 
feature of politics invariably less as a precursor to longer-term reform, than as a 
means to diffuse opposition, placate external agencies, and secure political office. In 
this context, anticorruption campaigns then degenerate into political rhetoric 
designed more to appease foreign donor and international financial institutions than 
to address the major issue of combating corruption.  
 Olowu (1993) posits that in Nigeria political actors, often talk of accountability 
and integrity but this by itself does not translate into a genuine commitment to detect 
and panelize unethical behavior. Even when anticorruption agencies are created, 
they are usually denied the resources needed to achieve their stated purpose.  
 In many cases the codes of ethics they are asked to enforce have no broad-
based popular understanding or support. Furthermore, “the preoccupation with panic 
measures and the creation of adhoc panels and tribunals to replace non-functioning 
legal institutions for ensuring public accountability have not been particularly helpful”, 
Olowu (1993) also posits that in the former Soviet Union, anticorruption legislation 
was promulgated that required government officials to make public statements of 
personal networth.  
 However, the legislation was not accompanied by provisions for verifying 
information or sanctioning the submission of false statements. As a result, public 
cynicism intensified when some of the nation’s wealthiest individuals reported 
absurdly low networth statements, contradicted by their extravagant lifestyles and 
possessions.  
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 Fatigues, fear, resignation, and opportunism may diminish the commitment of 
political reformers and attenuate political will. As a result, anticorruption may break 
down, and corruption continues. Examples abound around the world of exploitative 
rulers who have hidden their motives behind a façade of cosmetic measures or well-
intended reformers who have engineered their own destruction through ineffective 
strategies.  
 In the light of these traps, proponents of political reform processes must look 
at several indicators that can serve as demonstrations of political will. Because of 
weak political will or lack of it, the Presidency of Momoh in the Sierra Leone was 
accused of being drenched in sectionalism, tribalism, favouritism, nepotism, 
incompetence, ineptitude, treachery, indolence, wining, dining and womanizing, 
which inflicted the severest mismanagement of the affairs of the country (WILLIAM, 
1995; SIERRA LEONE NEWS AGENCIES, 1992; WILLIAM, 1996a, 1996b).  
 One of the greatest dangers of corruption is that it weakens trust in 
government. It undermines the legitimacy of political leaders and their institutions. 
According to Kpundeh (1999) revelations of misdeeds have led people to believe that 
public officials wish only to get rich at their expense, that the country’s resources are 
being wasted and stolen, and that-bribery is the quickest way to get things done.  
 These attitudes have led to serious crises of confidence in both public officials 
and public institutions. He emphasizes that corruption adversely affects democratic 
processes. Cases of money disappearing from governmental treasuries are 
indications of the disastrous effects of corruption to democratic institutions, and 
economic mismanagement create poverty.  
 Good political will leads to good governance because it has a reciprocal 
dimension which entails efficient and effective reciprocity between rulers and the 
ruled with responsiveness incumbent upon the government (KPUNDEH, 1992, 1993, 
1995).    
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Research design 
 Exploratory research design was used for the study. Exploratory research 
design is used to study and gain insight into a situation that is not very clear and that 
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has not attracted serious investigation and research in the past. The objective of 
exploratory research is to define a problem more succinctly and develop course or 
courses of action that will lead to its solution. The nature of exploratory research 
requires the use of a flexible research process. It is evolutionary and historical in 
nature and it rarely involves the employment of large samples or use of structured 
questionnaire. A typical example of an exploratory research is a case study of a 
problem situation (ASIKA, 2004). 
3.2.  Population and samples 
 The study population is comprised of the people in Nigeria. The sample of the 
study was selected through the simple random sampling method. The sample size 
was determined using the Yamane’s technique.  
3.3.  Data collection method. 
 Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Secondary 
data were collected using a schedule titled “Corruption Index Format” (CIFO). The 
CIFO was designed with five columns. Primary data were generated through a 7-
point Likert-type questionnaire. Previous investigations have found the Likert scale 
questionnaire to be acceptably internally consistent, with a Cronbach’s Alpha value of 
about .82. Content and construct validity has also been established (MADSEN, 
2003a). Data collected were supplemented, complemented and validated through 
each other by discussions, interviews, and observations. 
3.4.  Method of data analysis 
 Data were analyzed through descriptive and Chi-square statistical methods. 
The results were presented in tables capable of understanding and re-analysis. 
4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
Table1: Selected Reported Outstanding Corruption Allegation Cases in Nigeria As At 
2015 
S/
N  
Amount  Secondary Source  Brief Description  Status  $ N 
1 $9.7m   Guardian vol. 31, No. 13319 
Private loaded with cash seized in South 
Africa  Pending  
2 $7.5bn   Daily sun, vol. 10, No. 3161 Tax evasion by oil & gas companies  Pending  
3 $9.8bn  Daily sun, vol. 10, No. 3167 Amount unremitted to NEITL by IOCs Pending  
4 $11.6b  Daily sun vol. 10, No. Total amount due to FGN for 2012 not Pending  
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n  3161 paid by oil & gas industry.  
5   N8bn Daily sun, vol. 10, No. 3165 
Part of local currency scam involving 
CBN officials  Pending  
6   N15bn Daily sun, vol. 10, No. 3165 
Corruption charge against Nyako, others 
by EFCC Pending  
7  N62bn Sunday sun, vol. 10, No. 628 
Corruption charge against Orji’s, son by 
EFCC Pending  
8  $8.8m  Daily sun, vol. 10, No. 3165 
Corruption charge against oil & gas Chief 
Deepak, K. Pending  
9  $2,58trn   
Nation vol. 7, No. 
2553 Mega-oil subsidy scam since 2011/2013  Pending  
10  $30trn   Vanguard, vol. 25, No. 62332 
Allegations of economic mess by C.C 
Soludo  
No clearer 
information 
11 $20bn   Nation vol. 8, No. 2701 
Allegations of unremitted money against 
NNPC by CBN governor  Pending  
12  $49bn  Nation vol. 8, No. 2701 
Allegations of missing money against 
NNPC by CBN governor  Pending  
13   N500bn  
Nation vol. 8, No. 
2701 Allegations of missing SURE-P money  
No clearer 
details  
14  N1.3trn  National vol. 7, No. 2316 Allegations of debt owed NNPC by FGN  Pending 
15  $32.3bn   
Daily sun, vol. 10, No. 
3150 
Allegations of mismanagement of public 
fund by FG Pending  
16  $13bn   Daily sun, vol. 10, No. 2761 
Allegations of remittance of only $17 out 
of $20bn oil money by NNPC  Pending  
17  N22bn  Nation vol. 8, No. 2695 
Allegations of sum not remitted to FG by 
NNPC - Sanusi Pending  
18  N24bn  New telegraph vol. 1, No. 23  
Allegations of missing police pension 
money  
Defended 
by CME 
19 $1.3trn   Nation, vol. 7, No. 2316 Govt. owes us $1.3trn on subsidy  Pending  
20  $43m  Nation, Dec. 27, pp. 15 Allegation of profiteering on aviation fuel  
No clearer 
details  
21  $1.7trn   Guardian vol. 29, No. 12185 
Refund of amount misapplied by NNPC 
and others in the oil subsidy scam  
Report not 
yet 
adopted. 
No refund 
made  
22  $620000  
Nation vol. 06, No. 
2170  
Bribery allegation against Lawan by 
Otedola  
No clearer 
news again 
23  N118n New telegraph, vol. 1, No. 23 
Amount allegedly recovered by FMOF 
through ghost workers elimination  No news  
24   N295b  New telegraph vol. 1, No. 2  Allegations of wasteful budget allocation  No news  
25   N4,6bn Nation, vol. 7, No. 2270 
EFCC arraigns 13 new marketers over 
oil subsidy fraud  No news  
26  N382bn 
Nation, Vol. 7, No. 
2302 
Fuel subsidy fraud: EFCC grills 11 more 
marketers  No news  
27  N109m Nation Vol. 7, No. 2283 Alleged N109m pension fraud  In court  
28  N750bn 
Nation vol. 8, No. 
2701 
Allegations of annual oil money theft by 
Tambuwal No news  
29  N255m  Nation vol. 8, No. 2701 
Allegations of poor handling of bullet 
proof car scam by Tambuwal  No news  
30  N5trn  Nation, vol. 9, No. 3080 
Alleged cost of abandoned projects by 
N.A Darma, Fmr director NPC  No news  
31 $1182m  
Sunday Vanguard, vol. 
24, No. 1483  Bribery case against Halliburton  
Still 
pending  
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32  N474bn  
Daily Sun, vol. 10, No. 
3192 
Allegations of bureaucratic corruption 
against ex-gov. Senator T.A Orji of Abia 
State  
No. Clearer 
direction 
yet  
33 Multimillion  
Multibill
ion 
Daily Sun, Vol. 10, No. 
3211 
Perceptions of lack of transparency in 
the liquidation of NITEL/MTEL 
To be 
probed by 
the FG 
34   N3.180bn  
Daily Sun, vol. 10, No. 
3211 
Allegations of misappropriation of 
N3.180bn MDG’s funds by the SSAp  
Fresh 
petition by 
Efulu 
35  US$241m  
Energy Today, Vol. 2, 
No. 15, pp: 7 SAGEM, SA ID Card Scandal  
In the 
cooler  
36  N1trn  Daily Sun, vol. 10, No. 3216, pp:12  
Allegations of diversion of N1trn against 
the EFCC boss  
Before the 
senate 
Ethics 
committee  
37  N183.7bn  
Daily Sun vol. 10, No 
3216, pp: 46  
Allegations of misappropriation between 
2008/12 at NDDC  
before the 
presidency 
38  N567bn  
Daily Sun, vol. 10, No. 
3218, pp 49  
Allegations of illegal spending by CG 
NCS 
Petition 
before the 
presidency  
39  
Multibill
ion 
naira  
Daily Sun, vol. 10, No. 
3218 pp. 5 
Allegations of fraud against SGF over 
Centenary city project   
Petition 
before the 
presidency  
40 US$12bn   
The Guardian, vol. 32, 
No. 13402 
Allegations of stealing US$12bn meant 
for the power sector by politicians  
Under 
senate 
probe. 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015. 
Table 2:  History of some Abandoned Projects in Nigeria As At 2015  
S/N  Brief description  Amount Secondary source  Status  Remarks  $ N 
1 
As at 1993 4000 
federal government 
abandoned projects 
all over Nigeria  
 300bn  
Guardian vol. 29 
No. 11922 – 
2011- 12 – 8 -  
Abandoned 
projects  
Houses, schools, 
roads, bridges, 
railway tracks, 
dams, tunnels, air 
ports, seaports, 
etc 
2 
Between 1986 and 
2009 14 abandoned 
road projects in Ondo 
State  
 2.1bn  
Guardian vol. 
29, No 11922. 
12-8-2011  
Abandoned 
projects  
Roads, houses, 
churches, etc.  
3  
In 2012 the high 
profile Lagos – Ibadan 
Expressway project 
was cancelled by the 
federal government  
 89.53bn The Nation, vol. 7, No. 2316 Not clear  
Allegations of lack 
of project finance 
and competence.  
4  
8000 – abandoned 
federal government 
projects as at 2014  
 5trn  The Nation, vol. 9, No. 3080 
No clear 
and full 
details  
Too many 
abandoned 
projects  
5 Ajaokuta steel complex  
Multi 
billion   
Sunday 
Vanguard vol. 
24, No. 1479  
Abandoned 
for many  
years  
Demons are being 
blamed  
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
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Table 3: List of 18 Out of 36 States In Nigeria Unable To Pay Workers Salaries for 
Over 3 months as at 29/5/15 
S/N  Name of state Remarks  
1 Abia  Workers lamenting their ugly 
plight  
2 Akwa Ibom  ” 
3  Bauchi  ”
4 Benue  ”
5  Cross River ”
6 Ekiti ”
7  Imo  ” 
8  Jigawa  ” 
9  Kano  ” 
10  Katsina  ” 
11 Kogi  ” 
12  Ogun  ” 
13  Ondo  ” 
14  Osun ” 
15  Oyo  ” 
16 Plateau  ” 
17 Rivers  ” 
18  Zamfara  ” 
  Source: Field work: 2015 
Table 4: List of States With External Debts As At 29/5/2015 
S/N  Name of state  Amount ($)  Status  
1  Lagos  $1.087bn Outstanding 
2  Kaduna  $234m ” 
3  Cross River  $131,469m ” 
4  Edo  $123m ” 
5 Osun  $109m  ” 
6 Bauchi  $87m  ” 
7 Enugu  $62m  ” 
8  Katsina  $78m  ” 
9  Osun  $67m  ” 
10 Oyo  $72m  ” 
 Source: Field work, 2015 
Table 5: Nigeria’s Poverty Levels (2004-2011) 
Poverty measure (in 
%)  
2004  2010 2011 
Relative poverty  54.4  69  71.5  
Absolute poverty  54.7  60.9  61.9  
Dollar per day  62.8  61.2  62.8 
 Source: Okafor, 2014. 
Table 6: Frequencies 
Measures   Observed 
N 
Expected N Residual 
9.00 
25.00 
43.00 
96.00 
212.00 
Total  
9
25
43
96
212
385
77.0
77.0
77.0
77.0
77.0
 
-68.0
-52.0
-34.0
19.0
135.0
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Table 7: Test Statistics 
  
 
 
 
 a. 0 cell (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected 
cell frequency is 77.0. 
4.1.  Discussion  
 From the evidence in table 1 there is now no doubt in this study that there is 
corruption in Nigeria. There has always been rhetorics of anticorruption crusade in 
Nigeria from the military regimes of the 1960-1990s and more since the present 
democratic experiment. With the pretences at anticorruption crusade no meaningful 
result has been achieved even since the Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences, Act of 2000 was passed into law.  
 This is true because it is difficult if not impossible to reduce corruption if the 
government does not have the political will to curb it, ensure that the anticorruption 
agencies are not corrupt, punish corrupt officials, or reduce opportunities and 
incentives for corruption in vulnerable governmental agencies and parastatals 
(UNIAMIKOGBO, 2007).  
 The basic question should not be if there should be anticorruption agencies as 
is often debated in late developing democracies, but rather how to make them 
effective. Government must have the political will to ensure that anti-corruption 
agencies are independent, autonomous, secure from illicit influence, and have 
adequate means and knowledge to conduct their work.  
 To combat corruption effectively anticorruption bodies need a mandate broad 
enough to gather all relevant information, as well as being protected from political, 
and personal pressure, introducing at the same time strict rules of control over the 
interests, income, and property of the officials. Such political will, will also make it 
possible for the anticorruption agencies to have the financial, material, and other 
resources necessary to perform the required functions creditably (HOPKINSON; 
PELIZZO, 2006).  
 The political will to combat corruption is also the political will to pursue other 
issues necessary for good governance. Political will is essential for the unity of a 
Chi-Squarea 
df 
Asymp. Sig. 
351.558
4
.000
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nation and the happiness of the citizens. Strong political will is similar to Gowon’s 
1966 proposal for the unity of Nigeria. “Rule out disintegration, rule out unitarism, 
consider federalism with a strong centre, consider federalism with a weak centre, and 
if neither is acceptable, then construct an entirely new system unique to Nigeria”. 
 This example implicates the fact that political will must reflect the character of 
popular democratic intervention, departing from pressure group or political manifesto 
rhetoric to becoming a significant voice, seriously posing the questions and views of 
people serving governance as a practical and immediate political possibility.  
 Political will is the critical starting point to halt and begin to reverse the 
deepening pauperization and disempowerment of the Nigerian people by the ruling 
classes and power blocs whose interests, run counter to the needs of the great 
majority (MADUNAGU, 2011; WILLIAMS, 2000).  
 Corruption due to lack of political will to curb it, has resulted in the 
abandonment of many projects in Nigeria. As reflected in table 2, the values of the 
abandoned projects mostly reflect government money stolen by corrupt politicians, 
bureaucrats, business people, and sundry others.  
 Corruption through contract inflation in Nigeria has grown from the 10 percent 
mark-up, or the “wee my own” syndrome in the 1960s and 1990s to 100 percent 
bribery of the moment (OMOTOSO, 2011). The present phenomenon has surpassed 
the Sierra Leonean corruption and bribery password of “put for me” (KPUNDEH, 
1997). Significant others in Nigerian governance project are agitated at the high 
levels of abandoned projects which grew from 4000 in 1993 to 8000 in 2014.  
 Agbakwuru (2015) reports the Speaker of the Federal House of 
Representatives stating that “demons” could be responsible for abandoning projects 
like the Ajaokuta Steel Mill in Kogi state. The matter is as serious as that. 
Abandonment of huge projects leads to unemployment and poverty.  
 In a country where half of the federating states do not pay salaries as and 
when due, where the treasuries are cleaned up by political leaders, it would mean 
that the majority of the people would wallow in absolute poverty. Because of 
corruption and the lack of political will to combat it, absolute poverty rate grew from 
55 percent in 2004 to about 63 percent in 2011 (OKAFOR, 2014).  
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 The confirmation of the G.7 Leaders of industrialized nations that the Nigerian 
government is facing severe handicaps due to lack of resources and 
mismanagement suggest that corruption is the mother of poverty. In the midst of 
poverty people elected to represent the people often waste time debating their pay, 
refreshments, meals, and sometimes, the age of little girls they can marry (OJIABR, 
2012).  
 According to Fani-Kayode (2013) “Every Nigerian should bow his or her head 
in shame from today because what the senate did and seeks to do in the future by 
beginning the process to amend our constitution in order for it to cater for their filthy 
appetite, and godless fantasies of child molesters and sexual predators is sordid, 
ugly and unforgiveable.  
 To curb corruption in the chambers and ensure sound law making, 
parliamentary codes of conduct can help by providing a frame work within which 
members and the public can know what behavior is expected of members. They can 
serve as a means of encouraging the observance of high standards and of helping to 
develop a culture of compliance, openness and accountability and ensure that in the 
councils of government, members must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought.  
 The level of corruption in Nigeria has risen so high that people now want to 
blame the “demons” for inflicting the epidemic on the country. Since the 1970s there 
have been accusations and counter accusations of corruption in the governance of 
Nigeria bordering on brazen acts of indiscipline in all its ramifications, 
misappropriation of public funds that went unchallenged, oil merchants and agents 
owing their massive wealth to illegal oil deals, contract inflation etc Agwunobi (2005). 
 While all these went on, salaries of civil servants and teachers remained 
unpaid, hospitals remained without drugs, schools without textbooks as states are 
unable to meat their statutory obligations (HOPKINSON; PELIZZO, 2006; ELAIGWU, 
1985; NELSON, 2015). With a high Chi-square value of about 352, against a table 
value of approximately 9, a strong positive relationship between political will and 
anticorruption crusade management was established. 
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4.2.  Recommendations 
i)  Elected and appointed government officials have the responsibility to 
discharge the functions of their offices without fear or favour for the benefits of 
the greater majority. The governments must enforce this. 
ii)  Political will is required in governance not only to curb corruption but also to 
pursue other legitimate goals. Contemporary political leaders can learn a lot 
from the political will of Gowon exemplified by his 1966 proposal. “Rule out 
disintegration; Rule out unitarism, consider federalism with a strong centre; 
consider federalism with a weak centre; where neither is acceptable, then 
construct an entirely new system unique to Nigeria”. This is political will in 
action. 
iii)  Political will does not start nor end with the establishment of anticorruption 
agencies. The laws establishing them must be clear enough, and they must 
have the necessary autonomy to perform. Instances where the law stipulates 
penalties for people not declaring their assets, and none for those falsifying 
such information do not present a political will to curb corruption. 
iv)  Curbing corruption will require amending some aspects of the Nigerian 
Constitution such as the immunity clause that provides great incentive for 
corruption in high political places.  
v)  With over 8000 abandoned projects in Nigeria that requires about N5trn to 
complete, government should urgently revisit the issue as a major step in 
anticorruption crusade management. This is important because contractors, 
politicians and high level bureaucrats simply share mobilization and final 
contract fees and disappear, only for us to turnaround to blame “demons and 
witches” for the abandonments. It is doubtful if demons take bribes like most 
politicians do. 
4.3.  Scope for further study 
 Further study should examine the relationship between corruption and 
instability of government. This is crucial because there is empirical evidence that 
corruption undermines the legitimacy of government. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 The ugly challenge of endemic political corruption has continued to put 
countries into serious problems of underdevelopment, due to weak political will or the 
total lack of it to curb it. Corruption in whatever form is largely responsible for 
breeding a group of people in the corridors of political power frequently drenched in 
sectionalism, tribalism, despotism, favouritism, nepotism, incompetence, dictatorship, 
ineptitude, treachery, indolence, winning, dining, political rascalism and womanizing 
that bring about infrastructural decay, poverty and the worst, mismanagement of the 
affairs of a nation.  
 This exploration provided fresh empirical evidence to buttress the postulation 
that political will is a major instrument of anticorruption crusade management and the 
fact that the absence of it provides the incentive for monumental corruption deeply 
associated with abandonment of government projects and absolute poverty among 
the citizens of a nation. Political will to curb corruption is also the political will to 
pursue other national goals, like national unity. It is not equivalent to a pressure 
group approach or political manifesto rhetorics.  
 Rather it is a reflection of the commitment of the political leadership to take 
decisive actions. An example of political will is reflected in Gowon’s 1966 proposal for 
national unity. “Rule out disintegration, Rule out unitarism, Consider federalism with a 
strong centre, consider federalism with a weak centre, and where none is acceptable, 
then construct an entirely new system unique to Nigeria”. Through statistical analysis 
the study found a strong positive relationship between political will and anticorruption 
crusade management. 
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